---
name: "mac_none"
section: "4"
platform: "linux"
package: "freebsd-manpages"
version: "6.0-5"
release: "Debian 4.0 (Etch)"
platforms: ["linux", "freebsd"]
url: "https://new.carta.tech/mac_none"
---

# mac\_none(4)

null MAC policy module

## NAME

**mac\_none** – null MAC policy module

## SYNOPSIS

To compile the null policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your kernel configuration file:

**options MAC** **options MAC\_NONE**

Alternately, to load the sample module at boot time, place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

**options MAC**

and in [loader.conf(5)](/loader.conf/5.md):

```
mac_none_load="YES"
```

## DESCRIPTION

The **mac\_none** policy module implements a sample MAC policy that has no effect on access control in the system. Unlike [mac\_stub(4)](/mac_stub/4.md), none of the MAC entry points are defined.

### Label Format

No labels are defined for **mac\_none**.

## SEE ALSO

[mac(4)](/mac/4.md), [mac\_biba(4)](/mac_biba/4.md), [mac\_bsdextended(4)](/mac_bsdextended/4.md), [mac\_ifoff(4)](/mac_ifoff/4.md), [mac\_lomac(4)](/mac_lomac/4.md), [mac\_mls(4)](/mac_mls/4.md), [mac\_partition(4)](/mac_partition/4.md), [mac\_portacl(4)](/mac_portacl/4.md), [mac\_seeotheruids(4)](/mac_seeotheruids/4.md), [mac\_stub(4)](/mac_stub/4.md), [mac\_test(4)](/mac_test/4.md), [mac(9)](/mac/9.md)

## HISTORY

The **mac\_none** policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

## AUTHORS

This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

## BUGS

See [mac(9)](/mac/9.md) concerning appropriateness for production use. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.